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ELECTIONS-VOTE FOR INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE-EFFECT-KNOWL-
EDGE OF DISQUALIFICATION.
Where a candidate on a primary ticket met a tragic death a few
days before the election, and the fact of his death was generally
published in newspapers throughout the state, together with the
statement that, if he received the greatest number of votes at the
primary, the state central committee would fill the vacancy, and
such statements were repeated in circular letters addressed to
political workers of the same faction of the party as that to which
the candidate belonged, so that it might be assumed that the elec-
tors were very generally informed of the candidate's death on
election day, and that a number thereof equal to the 5,287 major-
ity, which he received over the next highest candidate, voted for
him, with knowledge that he was dead, such votes could not be
counted, and the living person receiving the next highest number
of votes for the office was entitled to have his name go on the
ticket as the party candidate therefor. State v. Frear, 128 N. W.,
io68.
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It is the fundamental idea in American politics that the majority
shall rule, and that no person can be elected to office unless he
shall receive a majority or at least a plurality of all the votes cast.
In England where votes are cast for candidate known to be
dead or disqualified or for a fictitous person, the rule is that such
ballots are ineffectual for any person and cannot be counted in
determining the result of the election, and the one receiving the
next highest number of good votes is elected. All the English
cases uniformly so hold. King v. Hawkins, io East 211; King
v. Parry, 14 East 549.
But, where the candidate receiving the majority of votes is in-
eligible, in order to elect the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes, it must be shown that the voters had sufficient
notice of the facts constituting his ineligibility, or that they were
chargeable at law with such knowledge. Rex v. Monday, i
Cowp., 530; Rex v. Parry, Supra. Lord Campbell, C. J., said in
Reg. v. Coaks, 2 C. L. R. 947, "Now it is the law, both the com-
mon law and parliamentary law, and it seems to me also common
sense, that if an elector will vote for a man who he knows is
ineligible, it is as if he did not vote at all, or voted for a non-
existent person, as it has been said, as if he gave his vote for the
man in the moon."
The English rule has been followed in its strictest sense in but
one American jurisdiction, that of Indiana, where it has been held
that where voters at an election either know as a matter of fact
or are bound to know in law, of the ineligibility of any candidate,
the election does not result in failure but the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes is elected. Vogel v.
State, lO7 Ind. 374; Gulick v. New, 14 Ind. 93. The Indiana
courts seem to have carried this doctrine to the extent of saying
that where the majority candidate is ineligible, the minority can-
didate is elected even though the electors were ignorant of such
ineligibility. State v. Gallagher, 81 Ind. 558; State v. Johnson,
IOO Ind. 489. This extreme construction, however, is not in
accord with the American policy that the majority shall rule and
later cases have modified the rule to the extent that unless there
is knowledge of the ineligibility on the part of the voter at the time
he casts his ballot, the candidate receiving less than a plurality of
the votes is not elected. State v. Bell, 169 Ind. 61 ; State v. Ross,
17o Ind. 704.
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The great weight of authority, both English and American, is
to the effect that votes knowingly cast for a candidate who cannot
possibly exercise the functions of the office if elected, are thrown
away. Cases "intimating this are Commonwealth v. Cluley, 56 Pa.
St. 27o and Howe v. Parry, 92 Ky. 26o. "A minority of the
whole body of qualified electors may elect to an office when the
majority decline to vote, or where they vote for one who is in-
eligible to the office, knowing of the disqualification. Notice of
the disqualifying fact, and of its legal effect may be given so
directly to the voter as to charge him with actual knowledge of
the disqualification, or the disqualifying fact may be so patent or
notorious as that his knowledge of the ineligibility may be pre-
sumed a.s a matter of law. But not only the fact which dis-
qualifies, but also the rule or enactment of law which makes it
thus ineffectual must be brought home so clearly to the knowledge
or notice of the elector as that to give his vote therewith indicates
an intent to waste it in order to render his vote a nullity." People
v. Clute, 5o N. Y. 451.
The contrary rule to this was adopted by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals in State v. Walsh, 7 Mo. App., 142. "If it is true that
a majority vote operates only to elect, and failing of that, goes
for nothing, then the most innocent mistake of fact on the part
of the majority, as the age of the person voted for-might avail
to elect a candidate who had received only a few scattering votes.
It is said, on the other hand, that if the American doctrine is cor-
rect, votes cast for a fictitious person avail to defeat an eligible
candidate; that if the voters choose to stay away, or what is the
same, throw away their votes, those votes should not be counted
as against valid votes. The force of this argument lies in the
assumption of an intent to throw away the vote. If the voter can
make his vote effective only by voting it in a certain way, and if
the result of his voting in this way is to secure a new election, at
which the majority can elect, how can it be assumed that the voter
intended to throw away his vote? If the death of a candidate of
a political party takes place, as here, immediately before the elec-
tion, there is no time for organization or for preparing new ballots.
If the sudden death of a candidate renders the votes ineffectual
for some purposes, it is not therefore to deprive the voter of his
vote. The majority are not obliged to fold their hands, nor are
the minority entitled because of his death, to prevail over the
majority; yet this would be the result if the majority vote is not
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to be counted against the minority candidate. But the majority
of voters, so far from desiring or intending to throw their votes
away, wish to use them to their utmost effect, and it is only by
a fiction, raised if at all, by the law, that the majority in such
cases throw their votes away.
"Though the fact that the candidate died on the morning of
the election, before the polls were opened, is known to the voters
and the judges of the election, if the deceased receives the highest
number of votes, they avail to defeat the opposing candidate, and
it cannot be assumed, on grounds of public policy, that the voters
intended to throw their votes away." The Missouri Court seems
to be the only state court taking this view of the question.
The Senate of the United States in the case of Joseph C.
Abbott, of North Carolina, rendered its decision against the Eng-
lish rule and the rule as followed in all the American states ex-
cept Missouri, as being anti-republican and anti-American. And
Abbott, who nothwithstanding he received only a minority of the
votes cast, claimed a seat upon the ground that he was the only
eligible person voted for, was declared not elected. And it was
distinctly asserted in the report of the committee that the fact
that the voters have notice of the ineligibility of the candidate at
the time they cast their votes for him makes no difference. They
asserted the broad doctrine, that in this country an election by
a minority of persons voting ought not to be tolerated under any
circumstances. Senate Rep. No. 58. 4 2nd Cong., Second Session.
The United States generally agree with the English cases that
where the candidate receiving the majority of votes is ineligible,
and that fact is not actually known to the voters, the next highest
candidate is not thereby elected. "And so where a sheriff who
was disqualified received the majority of votes cast, the next
highest in vote is not to be returned elected. The votes cast at an
election for a person who is disqualified are not nullities. They
cannot be rejected by the inspectors, or thrown out of the count
by the judges. The disqualified person is a person still, and every
vote thrown for him is formal. Commenweaith v Cluley, Supra.
Nor does the death on election day before the polls closed, of the
candidate receiving the majority of votes, thereby give the elec-
tion to the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes. State v. Speidel, 62 Ohio St. 156. One who has not
received a majority or plurality of the votes cast at an election is
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not entitled to the office. Therefore, the fact that the candidate
who received a majority of the votes cast at an election died before
the polls closed does not give the only surviving candidate the
right to the office as he did not receive a majority. And the
votes for the deceased candidate, having been cast for him in good
faith, it is immaterial whether they were cast before or after his
death. Howes v. Perry, Supra.
Where for any reason not attributable to the electors, the popu-
lar will is not expressed, the election is void and a new one must
be held. Cooley's Const. Lim., p. 616.
In the case at hand, however, in accordance with the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority, both English and American, all the voters
at the primary had such knowledge of the death of the nominee
who received the highest number of votes, as made it reasonable
for the court to assume that they intended to throw their votes
away and give the election to that person receiving the highest
number of votes.
THE LIMITATION OF THE RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR LOSS OF CONSOR-
TIUM IN NEGLIGENCE CASES.
Consortium is essentially an interest that grows out of the
marital relation. By the old common law acception of the term
consortium was the exclusive right which the husband and wife
had, respectively, to the society, co-operation and aid of each
other in every conjugal relation. Any act which was in its nature
destructive of the marriage status resulted in a loss of consortium
and gave rise to a right of action. Though it has never been
denied that this right to recover for the loss of consortium existed
in the wife as well as in the husband, in the early actions only the
husband was found seeking a recovery. The 'reason for the
failure of the wife to avail herself of her right was the technicality
which forbade a wife to sue in her own name. With the enact-
ment of modern statutes, came a time when the wife sought the
recovery as often as the husband. During this period the courts
were very lax in their examination into the character of the
wrongful acts and their effect upon the marital relation. No
attempt was made to discover whether the act destroyed the rela-
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tion or merely disturbed it. The third period in the develop-
ment of this right began a few years ago when this distinction
was first drawn. As a result, it is now held that in those cases
where the wrongful act merely disturbs the conjugal relation
neither the husband nor the wife can recover for the loss of the
consortium of the other. A number of cases have so held, one of
the most recent being Marri vs. Stamford Ry. Co., 78 Atlantic,
582 (Conn.).
In this case, the plaintiff and his wife, while driving, were run
into and injured by a car, which was negligently operated by a
servant of the defendant. The wife sued in her name and
recovered full compensation for her injuries, including pain and
suffering. The husband also sued and was awarded damages for
his injuries, and the sum of three hundred dollars was allowed
him for the loss of the consortium of his wife. The allowance of
this sum was assigned as error. The court upheld the contention
that such allowance was error, stating that in view of the married
women's statutes, a husband in an action for personal injuries to
his wife, may not recover for the loss of consortium, whether for
loss of what is termed service, or society, or both.
The common law theory that husband and wife were one neces-
sitated the joirning of the husband whenever the wife wished to
sue for a personal injury. That one was the husband and in him
were merged the wife's rights. i Chitty on Pleading, 84. Tech-
nically it was often impossible to join the husband in a common
law action, as in a case of criminal conversation, where the hus-
band was really a party to the wrong. Furthermore, whatever
damages were recovered became his property and not the wife's.
Cooley on Torts, p. 227. These conditions have been modified
by modern statutes as is shown in Betser v. Betser, i86 Ill., 537,
decided in i9oo. In this case a wife was permitted to sue in her
own name and recover for the loss of her husband's affections
from one who had alienated them. This recovery rests upon the
same grounds and is with the same rights which a husband has
under similar circumstances. So, too, in Seaver v. Adams, 66
N. H., 142, the wife was permitted to sue in her own name. The
tendency of modern legislation is to place the husband and wife
on a footing that is more nearly equal in the eyes of the law.
This right which the wife now possesses to recover for a personal
injury is property and regarded as the separate property of the
wife. Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 383.
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There are three types of cases in which the question of recovery
for a lessening or entire deprivation of the enjoyment of consor-
tium may arise, namely, abduction, alienation of affections, and
criminal conversation; and maltreatment of such a serious nature
as to deprive one spouse of the comfort and society of the other
for considerable period. 3 Blackstone Commentaries, 139. Such
offences pierce the very heart of the marital relation, and in these
cases a recovery will always be permitted. A husband who is
living apart from his wife, if he has not renounced his marital
rights, can maintain the action and it is not necessary for him to
prove the alienation of the wife's affections, or actual loss of her
society and assistance. Chambers vs. Caulfield, 6 East, 244;
Wilton v. Webster, 7 C. & P., 198; Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41
111..9.
That actual service of a household nature is the basis of a
recovery for loss of consortium is an erroneous idea. In Biga-
ouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass., 123, a husband was permitted to
recover for loss of consortium from a person who had criminal
conversation with his wife, although the act caused no actual loss
of her services to him, for it was held that the husband is not the
master of the wife, and cannot maintain an action for the loss
of her services as his servant. In Long v. Bove, io6 Ala., 57o,
which was a criminal conversation action, there was a claim for
damages for loss of wife's services. The claim was allowed, but
the services were not regarded as meaning labor performed, or
assistance in any material sense. The court held that the depriva-
tion of services, for which the claim was allowed did not imply a
loss measurable by pecuniary standards of value such as obtained
when a master is deprived of the labor of his servant.
A wrongdoer is conclusively presumed to intend the direct con-
sequences of his acts. Hale on Damages, 36. One who has
criminal conversation with another's wife, or who alienates her
affections, strikes at the foundation of the marital relation. The
destruction of that relation is the direct consequence of his act,
and a recovery for the loss of consortium will be allowed. Noxon
v. Remington, 78 Conn., 296; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn., i.
In negligence cases, however, it cannot properly be said that
any effect upon the marital relation as such is. the direct result
of an injury occasioned by a want of care on the part of a third
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person. Feneff v. R. R., 203 Mass., 278. This is the most
modem doctrine in regard to consortium. For many years con-
cortium has not been so restricted in negligence cases. In Baker
V. Bolton, i Campbell, 493, decided in i8og, a case not unlike most
modem negligence cases, the husband was permitted to recover
for the loss of the consortium of his wife. But this error was
based on what has recently been shown to be an even more flag-
rant error, namely, the theory that service in the material sense
and consortium were one and the same thing.
There is another reason why a recovery for the loss of consor-
tium should not be permitted in negligence cases. By modern
legislation, as has been shown, each spouse may now redress his or
her injury in a suit for damages. Suppose a wife were injured
through the negligence of a third person, she may recover in her
own name for all expense attaching to the injury, and for pain
and suffering. Under the old theory, the husband would still
have a right of action for the loss of consortium, but this would
be the sole basis of such an action. However, this is answered by
the language of Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight, 9 House
of Lords cases, 577, 598: "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot
value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act
complained of causes that alone." Therefore, consortium cannot
be the only basis of a recovery; it must be used as aggravation
of damages or not at all.
A husband cannot recover in negligence cases for loss of wife's
consortium, Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry Co., 205 Mass., 42o,
nor can a wife recover in such cases for the loss of her husband's
consortium. Feneff v. R. R., 203 Mass., 278.
Therefore it is submitted that the only cases in which compensa-
tion should be granted are those in which the wrongful act inter-
feres with the exclusiveness of the marital relation, for this is the
essence of the right of consortium, or where the act is wanton,
malicious or intentional. In such cases, the loss of consortium is
the direct result of the act and necessarily foreseen. But in the case
of an injury arising from ordinary negligence the interference
with the relation is indirect, remote, consequential and contingent.
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,CHARACTER OF A PORTABLE HOT AIR FURNACE WHEN ANNEXED TO
THE REALTY.
Fixtures are a species of property which give rise to much liti-
gation. The courts are agreed with respect to the principles in-
volved, and the tests to be supplied in determining whether a chat-
tel is or is not a fixture. But there has been much fluctuation of
judicial opinion in applying these principles. In deciding concrete
cases the courts are in direct conflict with respect to certain species
of property, which have been annexed to the realty. Portable hot
air furnaces have been held to become part of the realty when
annexed to it by some courts while there are decisions of other
courts which hold that they do not become part of the realty when
so annexed. It is interesting to note, that cases, the facts of
which are identically the same, have been decided differently.
The recent case of Henry N. Clark Co. v. Skelton et al., 94
N. E., 399 (Mass.), holds that a portable hot air furnace resting by
its own weight upon the ground, placed in a house by a person
rightfully in possession, does not become part of the realty, though
connected with the house by a cold air box, and hot air pipes and
registrars in the usual manner. The question has been settled in
Massachusetts, and this case was appealed for a refusal to give
certain instructions. The case is of interest because of the fluc-
tuation of opinion with respect to hot air furnaces of this char-
acter.
"Real fixtures consist of things, originally chattels personal,
which have been annexed to the land, or to things permanently
attached to the land, by the owner of the chattel or with his assent,
and with the intention to make the annexation permanent. The
most important element of the definition is the intention with
which the annexation is made. In order that it may be a real
fixture and become part of the land itself, it is essential that the
chattel should have been annexed permanently; that is without
intention to remove it, or sever the connection between it and the
land. This intention, however, is to be drawn from the surround-
ing circumstances or the express agreement of the parties, and not
from their mere declarations or idle conjectures." Minor and
Wurts on Real Property, Sec. 23. This is the main test to be
applied in determining the character of a chattel which has been
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annexed to land. But from the decisions to be considered it 
will
appear that the test has lead to different conclusions 
in similiar
cases.
In Baldscin v. Merrick, i Mo., App. 281, it was held that 
a fur-
nace not fastened down, but set upon a stand of brick 
work, and
which could be carried out without disturbing the ceiling 
walls or
doors or floors of the house, even though a fixture 
as between
vendor and vendee, is not a fixture within the meaning 
of the
mechanic's lien law. And Rahway Say. Inst. v. Irving 
St. Bap-
tist Church, 36 N. J., Eq. 61, is in harmony with this decision. 
It
was there held that a portable furnace standing on the 
cellar floor,
and held in position by its own weight, and capable 
of being
detached, together with its pipes and registers, without 
injury to
the building, is not as between mortgagor and mortgagee 
a fixture.
It must be noted that in the cases cited the word, "fixture" 
is used
in the sense of "real fixture." Towne v. Fiske, is also 
to the same
affect. 127 Mass., 125.
The question as to whether a chattel is or is not 
a real fixture
arises between landlord and tenant, mortgagor and mortgagee,
purchaser and seller, and in many other cases where 
a similiar
relation exists. In Turner v. Wentworth, 1i9 Mass., 
459, the
plaintiff claimed a lien on certain furnaces furnished by 
him. He
built a house for the defendant and by his contract he 
was required
to put in two furnaces. The court held that if the transaction 
was
merely a sale of furnaces and ranges as personal 
property there
would be a lien. But if by this contract the furnaces 
and ranges
were to be furnished as parts of the houses, and were 
in fact so
applied, there was no lien. The case of the Ridgeway 
Stove Co.
v. Way, 141 Mass., 557, seems to be in conflict with 
Towne v.
Fiske, supra, and the principle case, which are both 
Massachusetts
cases. In this case, a portable furnace was put into a 
house, under
an agreement that it should remain the property of the 
seller until
paid for. It rested by its own weight upon a circle of 
bricks set
on the cellar floor, and was connected by pipes placed in the 
house
when it was built. The defendant purchased the house 
being
ignorant of the agreement. In an action by the seller 
of the fur-
nace against the purchaser of the house, the court held 
that the
furnaces were part of the realty, and that the defendant 
had be-
come the owner thereof.
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Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. (Me.), 154, it was held that by the
conveyance of a saw mill with the appurtenances thereto, the mill
chains, dogs and bars being in their appropriate places at the time
of the conveyance, were passed thereby. The court said: "Things
personal in their nature, but fitted and prepared to be used with
real estate, and essential to its beneficial enjoyment, being on the
land at the time of its conveyance by deed, do pass with the realty."
A factory bell, hung in a tower built upon the factory to receive
it, is a part of the realty. Alvord v. Carriage Mfg. Co. v. Gleason,
36 Conn., 86. And in Stockwell v. Cam pwell, 39 Conn., 362, it
was held that a portable hot air furnace placed in the cellar of a
dwelling house and set in a pit prepared for it, in the bottom of
the cellar, where it is held in place simply by its own weight, is a
part of the realty. And so also is a smoke pipe leading from the
furnace to the chimney of the house. The court also said that a
water wheel from a mill is held to be a part of the mill. And
Scottish American Insurance Co. v. Sexton, 26 Ont., 77, follows
Stockwell v. Campwell, supra.
Iron stoves fixed to the brick work of the chimnies of a house
are part of the house and pass with it, to the extent of an execu-
tion upon it. Goddard v. Chase, 7 Mass., 432. And iron backs
of chimnies belong to the executor. Harvey v. Harvey, 2 Str.
1141.
In Tolson v. Moore, 19 Me., 252, the court discussed the ques-
tion of the adaptability of a chattel with respect to its use in con-
nection with the freehold. The court said: "The better opinion
is, upon the authorities, that the stove in question being fitted,
adapted and designed for the use of the house would pass by a
conveyance of it as part of the real estate." The same ques-
tion is further discussed and explained in Copen v. Peckham,
,35 Conn., 88. Ordinary implements of a slaughter house, which
could easily have been removed, and set up elsewhere, were
held to be part of the realty, the court saying, "that to constitute
a fixture it is essential that the article should not only be annexed
to the freehold, but that it should clearly appear, from an inspec-
tion of the property itself, taking into consideration the character
of the annexation, the nature of the article annexed, its adaptation
to the uses and purposes to which the building was appropriated."
In Jernyn v. Hunter, 87 N. Y. Supp., 546, an heating apparatus
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was held to be part of the realty, following Stockwell v. Campwell,
supra.
From a consideration of the foregoing authorities, the better
opinion seems to be that a portable hot air furnace connected with
the house in the ordinary way, is a real fixture, and therefore part
of the realty when annexed. The nature of the annexation is such
that the premises become adapted to its use, and it becomes an
essential part of the realty.
LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITIES FOR TORTS OF OFFICERS OF THE
STREET CLEANING DEPARTMENT.
The liability of a municipal corporation for the torts of its
agents committed while in the prosecution bf their duties, is a sub-
ject which has presented many questions of technical nicety, and
has resulted in a diversity of opinion. It is generally conceded
that the duties imposed upon a municipal corporation are of a
dual nature, one arising from a grant of a special power in the
exercise of which it acts as a legal individual, and the other is
implied from the exercise of *political rights, under the general
law, as to which it acts as a sovereign. As to torts of agents arising
out of duties of the latter character, there is no question as to the
liability. The corporation acting as a sovereign is not liable.
And the corporation acting in the performance of duties of the
latter character through its agents, is liable for their torts. But
what has lead to confusion and diversity of opinion is the ques-
tion as to what constitutes a duty of the former class. Dillon on
Municipal Corporations, Vol. I, section 66 (4 th edition), says:
"In its proprietary or private character the theory is, that the
powers are supposed not to be conferred primarily or chiefly, for
considerations connected with the government of the state at
large, but for the private advantage of the compact community,
which is incorporated as a distinct legal personality or corporate
individual; and as to such powers or property acquired there-
under, and contracts made with reference thereto, the corporation
is to be regarded quo ad hoc as a private corporation, or at least
not public in the sense that the power of the legislature over it or
the rights represented by it, is omnipotent."
In the case of Hewitt v. City of Seattle, i3 Pac., io84, recently
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington, it was held that
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the liability of a city for injuries caused by defective streets, is
not limited to injuries caused by structural defects or obstructions,
and that a city was liable for injuries to one who was negligently
run over by an automobile driven by the superintendent of streets
while in the exercise of his official duties. In this complaint, the
plaintiff alleges negligence on the part of the city through its
agent Maloney, and that the automobile was being driven at an
unlawful rate of speed, and sues for damages. A verdict was
returned for $1,500, judgment was entered thereon, and the city
appealed. The decision was affirmed on appeal.
Qui facit per alium facit per se, is a maxim applied to the rela-
tion of principal and agent. And from this has developed the
doctrine of Respondeat Superior. Judge v. The City 6f Meriden,
38 Conn., 90, held, that surveyors of highways appointed by towns
and street commissioners appointed by cities, are, when repair-
ing defective highways, in the performance of a public duty, and
the rule Respondeat Superior does not apply to those corporations
in respect to such acts of such officers. But on the other hand,
Hall v. City of Austin, 73 Minn., 134, held that the duty of caring
for and supervising the condition of its public streets is one which
rests upon a municipal corporation as such and the doctrine of
Respondeat Superior applies.
In Severn v. The City and County of San Francisco, u15 Cal.,
648, the court held, that municipal corporations are not liable for
dereliction or remissness of municipal officers, or agents, in the
performance of public or governmental functions of the city, or
in the performance of duties imposed upon those officers which
are prescribed and limited by express law. And when an injury
results from the wrongful act or omission of a municipal officer
charged with a duty prescribed and limited by law, the doctrine of
Respondeat Superior is inapplicable, and the officer is not treated
as the agent or servant of the corporation in the performance
of such duty, but is held* to be the servant and agent of, and con-
trolled by the law, and for his acts the municipality will not be held
liable. Baker v. West Chicago Park Commission, 66 Ill. App.,
5o7, in substance held the same as the case above. The plaintiff
was injured from the negligence of the officers of the defendant
in giving the plaintiff, an employee, a vicious and unsafe horse to
use. • The court said: "If agents or servants of a municipal cor-
poration are independent of the corporation as to the term of their
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office and the manner of discharging their duties, the corpora-
tion is not impliedly liable for their acts of negligence, and the
doctrine of respondent superior does not apply."
A city is not liable for the negligence of a laborer employed by
its superintendent of streets, in the construction of a new street
which has been laid out by the Board of Aldermen, and which
they have directed the superintendent to build, if, under the
charter of the city, the superintendent was acting as a public
officer in employing the laborer and in constructing the street.
Jensen v. City of Waltham, 166 Mass., 344.
The street commissioner in rebuilding a retaining wall set up
a derrick so negligently that by reason of such negligence a laborer
on the work was injured and the municipality was held not re-
sponsible. Bowden v. The City of Rockland, 96 Me., 129.
The cases above discussed, for the most part, hold, that the acts
of a street commissioner or superintendent of streets in repairing
and supervising the repair of the streets of the city, fall under
the powers of the municipality, which are considered of a political
and public nature. City of Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed., 321, dis-
cusses the dual duties of a municipal corporation in the following
language: "Municipalities have two classes of powers, the one
political, public, in the exercise of which they govern their
people and act as delegates of the state; the other private, business,
in the exercise of which they act for the advantage of their in-
habitants and themselves. They are not liable in damages for the
acts and omissions of their officers and agents in the exercise of
the former. But they are liable in damages for the negligent and
wrongful acts and omissions of their agents and officers within the
scope of their authority, in the exercise of the latter." The courts
are in direct conflict as to what acts of servants and agents of a
municipality fall within this latter class of duties. In Normile v.
The City of Ballard, 33 Wash., 369, a city engineer was negligent
in wrongfully estimating the quantity of gravel removed by a
third person, resulting in the plaintiff making an overpayment for
such quantity as estimated. The court held that the city is liable
for the wrongful and negligent acts of its engineer, done in the
course of his official duties, with reference to the improvement of
the streets of the city.
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Collensworth v. The City of New Whatcom, 16 Wash., 224,
goes even further than any of the cases cited, in holding that
where a municipal corporation undertakes the construction of a
public work which falls legitimately within its corporate powers, it
is liable for any injury resulting from the negligence of an em-
ployee, although in attempting to exercise such powers, the cor-
porate authorities act in excess of the powers conferred by the
charter, and enter into a contract that is clearly ultra vires. And
in the case of the City of Denver v. Peterson, 5 Colo. App., 41, it
was held that the board of public works was one of the agencies
of the city for the transaction of its corporate business, and if
through negligence or malfeasance of this board or of its ser-
vants and employees, a cause of action accrues to an individual the
city must respond. The defendant in Hinds v. The City of Mar-
shall, 22 Mo. App., 2o8, was also held liable for damages caused
by defects in the street, although the failure to repair the same
was due to the negligence of the street commissioner. Funnell 2.
City of St. Paul, 20 Minn., 117, and Niven v. City of Rochester,
76 N. Y., 619, held the defendants liable under similar cir-
cumstances.
In Fox v. The City of Philadelphia, 2o8 Pa., 127, the city was
held liable for the death of a passenger, caused by the negligence
of an operator of an elevator, employed by the public building
commission, where the elevator in question was being used in
carrying the public to the courts, and the operator was being paid
by the city. And Missano v. Major, etc., of New York, i6o
N. Y., 123, practically the same question is presented and decided
in the same way. This case, in principle, is exactly the same as
the principal case. This was an action to recover for the death of
a child who was run over and killed by a horse attached to an ash
cart of the city cleaning department. The court held that the city
was liable for the negligent acts of its employees in its department
of street cleaning. And The New York and Brooklyn Saw Mill
and Lumber Co., App., v. City of Brooklyn, 71 N. Y., 58o, held
the same as the case above.
The duty imposed upon the city in keeping the highway clear
from encumbrances, is in its nature private, and the persons em-
ployed to perform it are the agents of the corporation in its private
capacity; and for their acts while so engaged, -the corporation is
liable civiliter, precisely to the same extent that any other master
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is liable for the acts of his servants while employed in his business.
Scott v. The City of New York, 50 N. Y. Supp., 19i. The com-
missioner of street cleaning of the City of New York is an agent
of the city, and not an officer of the general public, notwithstand-
ing his duties are partly rendered in the interests of the public
health, and his powers are plenary, and within their sphere, ex-
clusive of the authority of an officer of the city. The city is,
therefore, liable for his negligent acts done in the course of his
official duty. Barney Dumping-Boat Co. et al. v. Major, etc., and
The City of New York, 40 Fed., 50.
It seems from the authorities examined, that they divide them-
selves territorially. The New England states hold that the duties
of supervising the streets of a municipality are of the class de-
nominated public, and therefore the municipality is not liable for
damages resulting in the negligent or wrongful performance of
such duties by its officers or agents. As such, they are agents of
the public at large, exercising their duties under governmental
powers, on behalf of the state in general. B ut in other jurisdic-
tions, the great weight of authority seems to be that such duties
are part of the duties of municipalities, exercised for the benefit of
the compact community and of the municipalities themselves.
Therefore cities are liable for any damages resulting from the
negligent performance of duties of this nature, by their agents and
officers. Thus the weight of authority seems to be with the prin-
cipal case, although there are some conspicuous authorities which
have taken a decided stand against it, and the bulwark of which
is unshakable.
THE STATUS OF A STREET RAILWAY IN THE CITY STREETS.
In the New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. City of New York
et al., 127 N. Y. Supp., 513, the Hudson River R. R. Co. which
had been organized since 1846 for a term of fifty years obtained
from the State of New York the right to lay tracks in certain
streets in New York City. This company was afterwards consoli-
dated and became a part of the New York Central lines, under a
law that provided that the franchises of each corporation should
be vested in the new company. The city ordered the tracks of the
plaintiff to be removed at the expiration of the fifty-year term
because they had become a nuisance. The court enjoined the
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exccution of the order on the ground that the State alone had the
power to question the exercise of the franchise, and that the
franchises were not limited to the terms of years granted to each
corporation, but to length of time which had been granted to the
consolidation of the corporations which was five hundred years,
and hence all periods of franchises were lengthened to this time.
According to different rulings, the right of way granted to. a
railway in city streets have been described as franchises, ease-
ments, licenses and contracts. In re Thirty-fourth St. R. R. Co.,
io2 N. Y., 343, held that a franchise is a privilege conferred by
grant from the government or a sovereign power and is vested in
individuals or corporations.
According to B. & N. R. R. Co. v. Town of Alston, 54 W. Va.,
597, a permit to a railway from a city council for occupation is
not a franchise, but an easement, and the council by voting such
a permit, gives a license or grant thereof. Another view of a right
of way is spoken of in Mayor of Troy v. Troy and Lansingburgh
R. Co., 49 N. Y., 657, which held that a permit by a municipal cor-
poration to a railroad is a license granted upon certain terms which
becomes a contract between the parties. The City of Binghampton
v. B. P. & D. Ry. Co., 6i Hun., 479, brings out the idea of a right
of way being a contract in the following manner. In this case, the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover the
expense of paving between its tracks. It appeared that there was
inserted in the defendant's franchise a condition that they should
keep the highways within the rails and one foot outside thereof in
good repair. The city paved the street and now seeks to recover
damages for non-fulfillment on part of the defendant. Here it
seems that a right of way granted to a railway company to lay
tracks in its streets is regarded as a contract.
The inability to draw a line- of distinction between a right of
way and a license seems to have presented itself in Union Traction
Co. v. City of Chicago, 199 I11., 484, which held that by a City
and Village Act empowering cities and villages to license, tax and
regulate hackmen, draymen, etc., and all others pursuing a like
occupation and provide them compensation, that they might also
treat an ordinary street use as a license, and thus the two were
united together and within the power of the municipality.
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In regard to a right of way being an easement, the theory for
this point is found in Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y., 611, which held
that as a resolution passed by a common council authorizing
private persons-that is being for their benefit-the right to
operate a railway, if it is without limitation as to time or reserving
power of revocation is not a license, and.if valid is a contract,
which cannot be abrogated.
There is a difference, however, between a right of way, from.
either a license, easement or contract.
The first point of difference may be noted in People ex rel.
Emsfield v. Murray, 149 N. Y., 367, which held in considering a
question on liquor traffic that a license was not taxable as property,
while the street rights of a railway are taxable according to
People ex rel. Met. St. R. Co. v. Tax Commissioners, 174 N. Y.,
417, a franchise, by an amendment to the general tax law is for
purpose of taxation considered to be real estate, and also tangible
property such as rails and rolling stock is -taxable.
As between an easement in gross and street rights of a railway,
the former according to Minor & Wurts on Real Property, page
82, Sec. 86, is not assignable by the weight of authority, while the
rights of a street railway are assignable according to Parker v.
Elmira Co. & N. R. R. Co., 165 N. Y., 274, which held that a
right of way granted to railway is a privilege or franchise, and in
nature of property is alienable and transferable and can be as-
signed. Between a license and a franchise, a line of distinction
may be drawn, for by a license one might do an act which could
not be lawfully done otherwise without the grant of the State,
but a franchise carries with it an interest of the public according to
Pierce v. Emery, 32 N. H., 484, which held that land taken by
authority of the State for a public use and conveyed by a charter
to a corporation, the corporation holds it in trust for the public, in
which they have a continual easement. The remaining line of
distinction to be drawn is between a franchise and a contract;
the former being according to Queen v. Cambrian Ry. Co., L. R.
6 Qu. B., 422, an incorporeal hereditament while the latter is
always a chose in action.
The better theory it seems would be to consider the right of
a street railway in a street a franchise, which according to Blair
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v. City of Chicago, 211 U. S., 4oo, must be shown to have been
conferred in plain terms, and nothing passes by a grant of a fran-
chise except as is clearly stated or necessarily implied, and any
ambiguity in its terms is to be construed strictly in favor of the
grantor and against the grantee.
The City of New York no doubt thought that it was well within
its power when it attempted to remove the rails of the street rail-
way company, because they were a nuisance in N. Y. C. & H. R.R.
Co. v. The City of New York, 127 N. Y. Supp., 517, for the rulixig
in Hume v. Mayor of New York, 74 N. Y., 264, encroachments
made against private persons and unauthorized are to be consid-
ered as nuisances and it is the duty of the city to remove them and
in The Easton and Amboy R. R. Co. v. Inhabitants of Greenwich,
25 N. J. E., 565, a similar ruling is noticed, for in this case it was
held, that it is within the power and duty of city and town officials
to look out for the good of the town, and they may maintain an
action for the people and the people through them.
Without a doubt the City of New York over-stepped the limits
of its power, because the law of 1869 vested the legislature with
the power to determine the duration of the grants and privileges
of the consolidated company, which were measured by its life.
This case, however, affords the opportunity for one to consider the
different theories advanced to determine the status of a street
railway in the city streets.
